My new findings from firm-level surveys show that both a firm's probability of exporting and a firm's exporting volume increase with the firm's age after controlling productivity as well as that both probability of and quantity of export are higher among financially non-constrained firms, after controlling age and productivity. This paper develops a model with credit-constrained, heterogeneous firms to explore how financial constraints impact firms' exporting behavior and how these constraints are relaxed as firms mature up.
export more if they are not financially constrained, after controlling both age and productivity. Standard models assume that the financial market is complete such that firms can borrow with no financial frictions and immediately achieve the optimal level after entrance. Therefore these models have no implications on the growth process of exporting.
This paper develops a model with credit-constrained heterogeneous firms to explain how financial constraints impact firms' exporting, and test its implications in the data set Enterprise Surveys constructed by the World Bank.
This model describes how firms grow and relax their financial constraints such that they are more able to export over time. In the model, entrepreneurs have no wealth and need to borrow the initial sunk investment, the fixed cost, and the input of capital in the first period from a financial intermediary, in order to start up a firm. Then firms pay back loans and finance their further need of capital and fixed cost from their previous operating returns. Firms are heterogeneous in productivity, which is individually and independently drawn from a distribution. Firms are able to export after paying a fixed cost of exporting.
Firms may default every period and run away with their current stock of capital, while the lending market is perfectly competitive and the financial intermediary fully commits to the contract. In order to force firms not to default, the financial intermediary lends firms the less fund than the optimal capital in the initial period, otherwise these firms would run away, as the deviation benefit would dominate their return of production with a relatively low productivity. However, with firms accumulating capital in every period, they are finally unconstrained and are more able to export on average.
In order to define the financial status of a firm, I compare the benchmark model with another, which is identical to the benchmark except that contracts are fully enforceable. In other words, the entrepreneurs fully commit to the contract. All firms reach their optimal capital level immediately after the entrance. I define firms as financially constrained if their capital level is below the optimum under perfect enforceability. The model with imperfect enforceability implies that firms tend to export, or export more if they are not financially constrained; given the status of financial constraint, the probability of exporting, or the export volume grows with the firm age. The model also suggests that the financial constraints have attenuated effects in financially developed countries. In contrast, in a model with perfect enforceability, firms' exporting behavior is irrelevant with their financial conditions; after controlling firms' probability, firms' exporting behavior should be identical across countries. I use a firm-level data set from Enterprise Surveys, the World Bank to test the implications. I first use panel data covering 28 countries to test the relationship between financial status and exporting behavior.
I find that the probability of exporting is higher among firms with no financial constraint; the effect of financial constraint is diminishing with the increase in firms' age. After correcting the self-selection into exporting, firms tend to export more without a financial constraint. In order to test the cross-country the effect of financial constraints across countries. This paper is a complement to another trend of literature, which examine the effects of financial factors on the aggregate economy. Rajan and Zingales (1998, [32] ) show that financial development helps to reduce the cost of external finance for firms such that industrial sectors that depend relatively more on external finance grow faster in financially developed countries. Beck (2002, [9] ) explores the role of financial intermediaries in facilitating projects, and shows that financially developed economies have a comparative advantage in manufacturing industries. However, this trend of the literature explains the role of financial factors at sector level and does not specialize the effects on exports. This paper uses a firm-level panel data set to identify the role of financial constraints in firms' exporting behavior. This paper also tries to combine firm growth theory with new trade theory. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004, [3] ) develops a model in which firms have endogenous borrowing constraints because entrepreneurs face limited liability and the debt repayment cannot be completely enforced. The implication of this model is consistent with the stylized fact that firms experience high growth rates at their early stages of life with relatively large turnover rates. Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini(2004, [16] ) discusses aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability. It implies that economies with lower enforceability of contracts have higher macroeconomic volatility. Arellano, Bai, and Zhang (2010, [6] ) discusses cross-country difference in firms' growth rate and leverage ratio. But that paper focuses on firms' gerenral growth process, not being specialized in exporting.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents stylized facts. Section 3 briefly describes the model setup. Section 4 solves the model. Section 5 provides testable implications. Section 6 discusses data and shows empirical results. Section 7 concludes. Generally the time gap between two surveys is three years. All firms have at least five employees.
Stylized facts
Figure 2 to figure 5 shows that the exporting status and exporting volume of firms are related with firms' age, even after controlling for firm productivity. Figure 6 to figure 12 show that within each age group, status and exporting volume of firms are also related with firms' financial constraints, which will be defined later. Figure 2 depicts that the probability of exporting tends to be high among old firms, after controlling productivity. I categorize firms into three groups according to their age: group 1, labeled as "age 1", includes all firms with age less than or equal to 8, which is the 25% cutoff of firm age distribution; group 2, labeled as "age 2", include all firms with age between 9 and 17, the 25% to 75% of firm age distribution; group 3, labeled as "age 3", include all firms with age above 17. Three age groups represent all young, middle-aged, and old firms. One concern is that with increase in ages, firms tend to be more productive because firms with higher productivity are more likely to survive. Another reason for the productivity advantage among old firms is that firms may improve their productivity through learning-by-doing. If old firms are more productive on average, then the age effect is actually due to the productivity difference between young and old firms. To control the effect of productivity, I use logged and PPP-adjusted real sale per worker 2 three years before the survey year as the proxy of productivity. I split firms according to their productivity distribution: group TFP 1, TFP 2, TFP 3, and TFP 4 correspond to productivity 0 − 25%, 25% − 50%, 50% − 75%, and 75% − 100%. Figure 3 represents the distribution of logged and PPP-adjusted real export volume. There are four distributions on the graph: pooled samples, age group 1 (age<= 8), group 2(age 9 to 17), and group 3(age> 17). Old firms tend to export more as the density curve of group 3 is to the right of the other two groups. Figure 4 shows that the result is robust if I use age of exporting, instead of firm age. I categorize exporting firms into three groups: exporting age <= 5(exporting age 0 − 25%), 6 − 14 (exporting age 25 − 75%), and > 14 (exporting age 75 − 100%).The density curve of group 3 is distinct from group 1 and 2. Figure 5 repeat the work in figure 3 in four productivity groups to control the productivity effect.
The density curve of age group 1, 2, and 3 are distinct from each other in all four productivity groups and the distribution of old firms is to the right of the other two. In words, old firms export more after controlling for productivity.
I investigate what is behind the age effect. Financially constrained firms are defines as firms that applied for loans but got rejected, or firms that did not apply for loans because the cost of loans was too high 3 . This definition is similar to that in Angelini and Generale (2008, [2] ). First of all, I find that financially constrained firms tend to have fewer employees than their non-constrained counterparts, after controlling for age. The results is summarized in table 1. Figure 6 adds new features based on figure 2: within each age group, the probability of exporting is higher among firms with no financial constraints than those with financial constraints. The concern about the relationship between productivity and financial constraint is that less productive firms tend to have financial problems such that the probability of exporting may be low among these firms. To control the productivity effect, I split firms into four productivity groups as in figure 2 . In each productivity groups, firms with no financial constraint tend to export compared firms with financial constraint, while the probability of exporting tend to be high among old firms. Figure 8 summarize the distribution of logged export volume among financially constrained firms and non-constrained firms. The upper left depicts the whole sample. The black line represents firms with no financial constraints. It is to the right of the dashed black line, which represents firms with financial constraints. The upper right, lower left, and lower right draw export volume of firms with and without financial constraints in each age group. All sub-graphs show that non-constrained firms tend to export more than constrained firms. In order to control the productivity effect, I repeat the comparison of export volume in four productivity groups in figure 9 , 10, 11, and 12. These graphs demonstrate that non-constrained firms tend to export more than constrained firms after controlling productivity and age.
All figures above establish the stylized fact that firms with no financial constraints tend to export, or export more; the effect of financial constraints diminishes with the increase in firms' age. The next section provides a model to explain these stylized facts and build up a framework for empirical testing.
The model
Based on Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004, [16] ) and Melitz (2003, [25] ), I introduce the financial constraint into a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms. Instead of a closed economy, I reshape the model in an open economy environment for the purpose of discussing firms' exporting behavior. There are two countries, home and foreign 4 . Firms in each country produce heterogenous goods, using capital only. Time is discrete and the time horizon is infinite. By the symmetry of the home and foreign country, I only describe the economic environment in the home country.
Demand
The preference of a representative consumer in the home country is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution function:
where ω indexes the variety of goods. Ω h t is the support of ω, which represents all available goods in the home country in period t. These goods can be produced either in the home or foreign country. σ is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods. Assume the price for each good ω is p h t (ω). Then the 4 It is straightforward to generalize into a N-country model. By the data limitation, I do not investigate the difference in exports across trading partners. Therefore, I simplify all trading partners as one foreign country.
aggregate price in the home country is
Production
There is a continuum of firms, each firm produces a distinct good ω. Entrepreneurs run these firms. Prior to entry, all firms are identical. In each period, firms generate gross revenue from the domestic market p 
Financial contract
Firms need to borrow loans from banks in order to finance the initial investment I0, initial capital and fixed cost. The financial intermediary fully commits to its contract. In contrast, the entrepreneur may choose to default. In case of default, the entrepreneur can run away with the capital after paying certain costs, but never start a new firm. According to Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004, [3] ), an alternative way to understand the default is that the entrepreneur has an outside opportunity, which equals the capital in every period. The outside opportunity function is denoted as D(kt) = kt − κ, where κ is the cost the entrepreneur pays for the outside opportunity. The magnitude of κ measures how difficult it is to deviate. The entrepreneur can never re-enter the market upon deciding to exit.
The timing of events for a firm is summarized as follows. In period 0, the productivity A is drawn and observed by all agents: entrepreneurs and lenders. The productivity keeps constant in the following periods. Lenders lend the firm the initial investment I0, the fixed cost, and the capital for the production the next period. From period 1, events in a certain period can be described as a series: the firm may either deviate or continue production. If deviating, the entrepreneur exits the market with the capital and never re-enters the market. If continuing production, the firm receives dividend dt, pays back the lender Ot, and retain the fixed cost and capital for the next period.
In period 0, the firm borrows the initial investment I0, the fixed cost x1c
x and the capital k1. In period t, t = 1, 2, · · · , the firm earns total revenue from the domestic and foreign market (if export):
. As for the cost, the firm acquires capital for the next period, kt+1 and its accumulation of capital after depreciation is kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt; it also acquires the fixed cost for the next period xt+1c
x ; finally, the firm must pay the lender Ot. In total, the cost is kt+1
The dividend is the revenue minus the cost:
Therefore, the payment to the lender is
The optimal contract problem
Assume there are many competitive lenders in the lending market. If one lender does not provide the entrepreneur the best contract which maximizes the entrepreneur's discounted sum of dividends, the entrepreneur can walk away to another lender, who offers a better contract for the entrepreneur. Therefore, all lenders provide the contract that maximizes the entrepreneur's discounted sum of dividends:
Note that the firm receives dividends from period 1.
The optimal contract makes the firm keep producing in every period, and the lender breaks even at least. The first constraint of the optimal contract problem considers the possibility of deviation.
In every period t = 1, 2, · · · , if running away with capital before production, the entrepreneur receives
where kt is the capital acquired from the last period; κ is the cost the entrepreneur pays for the outside opportunity. 6 κ measures the financial development in a country. In an extreme case, if κ → ∞, the deviation cost is so high that no firm deviates. On the other hand, in every period 6 The qualitative results do not change if I use other types of deviation function, for example, D(kt) = ηkt, η ∈ [0, 1]. t = 1, 2, · · · , the return of keeping production is the discounted sum of dividends from period t and so on:
The return of production should be greater than the return of deviation such that the firm will never deviate:
The second constraint considers the lender's balance. In period 0, the lender lends the firm the initial investment I0, the initial capital k1 and fixed cost x1c x . From period 1, he receives the payment from the firm Ot, t = 1, 2, · · · . The discounted sum of all payments is ∞ t=1 β t Ot. The lender needs to break even at least:
The last constraint is that the dividend can not be negative because the entrepreneur has no wealth:
In summary, the complete optimal contract problem is
Solving the model
In this section, I first rewrite the original optimal contract problem into a saddle point problem, and then into a recursive problem following the method in Marcet and Marimon (1998, [27] ). I derive all useful conditions from these two forms of problems: dividends are expected to be zero when the no-deviation condition is binding; the entrepreneur begins to receive positive dividends after the no-deviation condition no longer binds.
The saddle-point problem
According to Marcet and Marimon (1998, [27] ), the original problem for the optimal contract can be re-shaped into a saddle-point problem. The formal derivation of the saddle-point formulation is in the appendix.
s.t. µ1 = 1 + γ1 λ0 (8)
where
Intuitively, the revenue net of capital accumulation and fixed costs is the resource of payments to the lender and dividends for the entrepreneur. It is easier to solve the problem by choosing capital kt+1 8 , and dividends dt directly, rather than by choosing payments Ot. Therefore, I write the payments Ot as a function of Rt(kt, kt+1) and dt, using the relationship between payments and dividends. The Lagrangian multiplier γt, t = 1, 2, · · · is for the no deviation constraint (4) and the Lagrangian multiplier λ0 for the lender's constraint (5) .
A direct observation is that µt ≤ 1. Otherwise, the coefficient for dt: −(1 − µt) is positive such that the objective function (7) would be optimized by infinitely large value of dt. Because of the upper bound of µt, by (9), the Lagrangian multiplier µt can not be always growing such that γt can not always be positive. Therefore, the no-deviation condition (4), which corresponds to γt will strictly holds eventually.
Another observation is that the constraint for the lender is always binding such that λ0 > 0. An intuitive way to understand the positive sign of λ0, or the lender's binding constraint (5) is that the lending market is competitive and every lender earns zero profit. If the constraint is not binding, or λ0 = 0, µt goes to infinity by the evolution function of µ (9).
Briefly summarizing the result from the saddle point problem, I obtain two results from the saddle point problem: µt ≤ 1 and λ0 > 0. In words, the firm finds that keeping producing goods strictly dominates deviation eventually and the lender earns zero profit. 7 The formal derivation is provided in the appendix. 8 It includes the choice of export decision x t+1 as k t+1 = k h t+1 + x t+1 k x t+1 .
The recursive problem
I rewrite the saddle point problem recursively as
The first order conditions for µ, d, k ′ are
With the envelope condition for k, the first order equation (12) can be re-written as
The detailed proof is in the appendix.
The relationship between µ and µ−1 corresponds to whether the no-deviation condition is binding. (11), following the observation from the saddle point problem, says that the multiplier µ cannot be greater than one; if µ > µ−1, the optimal dividend is expected to be zero in order to maximize V (A, µ−1, k); when µ reaches its maximum one, the optimal dividend can be positive because the item −(1 − µ)d is zero as long as µ = 1. Equation (13) reveals that the firm reaches its optimal capital level when the multiplier reaches its maximum µ ′ = µ = 1, or when the no deviation condition no longer binds.
The envelope condition derives that
Intuitively, when the constraint is binding (µ > µ−1), it is indifferent between deviating now or postponing one period later. The detailed proof can be found in the appendix.
I briefly summarize all useful information from the recursive problem. When the no-deviation condition is binding, the entrepreneur is indifferent between deviating and staying by (10) ; the optimal dividend is zero by (11) ; the firm is below its optimal capital level by (13) , where the optimal capital is defined as the capital level that maximizes R with no constraint. When the no-deviation condition no longer binds, the entrepreneur strictly prefers production; the optimal dividends becomes positive; the firm is at its optimal capital level.
Solving the firm's problem
After collecting all useful information, it is ready to solve the problem. First, I solve the problem backward starting from µ = µ−1 = 1. When µ = µ−1 = 1, the no-deviation constraint is not binding and the first order condition (13) gives the optimal capital k * . Then the second step is to solve the problem when µ < 1. Assume the no-deviation constraint for a firm is binding in period t, t = 1, 2, · · · , T and the firm reaches its optimal level in period T + 1, where T needs to be solved. At age T , by (14) , the firm is indifferent between deviating now or postponing one period later:
similarly, at age T − 1, it is indifferent between deviating at age T − 1 and T :
Furthermore, the similar argument can be expanded until age 1. Third, I use the zero-profit condition for the lender (5) to solve out the initial capital k1 and the optimal T . As for the export decision, all firms will serve the domestic market first. In other words, all exporting firms serve the domestic market because they would earn strictly higher profits and the fixed cost c h is already incurred. The detailed solution procedure can be found in the appendix.
All firms can be split into five groups: (i) productivity is so high that firms produce in both the home and foreign market at the optimal level; (ii) firms produce in the domestic market at the optimal level; they serve the foreign market below the optimal level initially but finally reach the optimal level; (iii) firms produce in the domestic market at the optimal level but do not export; (iv) firms produce in the domestic market below the optimal level initially, but the capital grows to the optimal level eventually;
(v) firms can not make the lender break even such that they never produce. I define four cutoff points among these five groups asĀ12,Ā23,Ā34,Ā45. Specifically,Ā12 defines the cutoff between type-(i) and type-(ii) firms. Similarly, all other three defines cutoffs between type-(ii) and type-(iii), type-(iii) and type-(iv), type-(iv) and type-(v) firms respectively. The solution of all cutoff points is in the appendix.
These five groups above are categorized as active firms (i) to (iv) and inactive firms (v), as . Melitz(2003, [28] ) categorizes all active firms into two groups: the pure domestic producer and the exporter. Active firm groups in this paper corresponds to the categorization in Melitz(2003) : firms in (iii) and (iv) are pure domestic producers and firms in (i) and (ii) are exporters. The more detailed classification in this paper, for example, splitting exporters into (i) and (ii), helps to understand why some exporting firms are relatively small initially but grow over time.
After solving the optimal contract problem for each individual firm and defining cutoff points, I can explicitly write out the aggregate price:
Perfect enforceability
Before proceeding to proportions from the model explained above, I briefly write out the model with perfect enforceability. I solve out the optimal capital level and two cutoffs: exporting firms vs. domestic producers, and active firms vs. inactive firms. I define firms' status of financial constraint by comparing two models.
If entrepreneurs fully commit to the contract, it is not necessary to consider the possibility of default.
The financial intermediary only needs to consider its budget constraint
Again the break-even condition can be written as
Moreover, lending market is competitive and every lender earns zero profit, the break-even constraint is always binding:
. Therefore, the problem can be transformed as
where (19) needs to hold because the dividends for the entrepreneur cannot be negative by (17) .
I define the cutoff productivity between exporting firms and domestic producers. If the firm begins to export, it reaches the optimal level in the initial period. Otherwise, it does not export at all. Therefore, the cutoff productivityĀ x guarantees the net return from the export market is non-negative every period:
, where k
As for the domestic market, all firms may produce because the fixed cost in the domestic market is zero: c h = 0.
The cutoff between active and inactive firms is defined as follows. Firms indifferent between producing and not make the financial intermediary break even:
whereS is a constant.
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Now it is ready to solve the optimal capital level k * per (A). For all firms with the productivity above the cutoff of exporting firms A ≥Ā x , they export x = 1, and the optimal capital is the sum of optimal capital level from home and foreign market k *
their optimal capital is from the domestic market k *
where P, Q is the symmetric aggregate price and aggregate demand in each country in the equilibrium.
The detailed solution is in the appendix.
Compare the case of perfect enforceability, I define financially constrained firms as firms that capital is below the optimal level in the model with perfect enforceability: kt(A) < k * 
Propositions

Imperfect enforceability
Denote the real export volume for a firm
as Lt. As all firms are born in period 0, the time period t also represents firms's age in that period.
Proposition 1 (1) For all firms, the expected probability of export among firms with no financial constraints is higher than that among firms with financial constraints: E0(xit|git = 0) > E0(xit|git = 1); for all exporting firms, the expected export volume among firms with no financial constraints is higher than that among firms with financial constraints: E0(Lit|git = 0) > E0(Lit|git = 1). (2) Even if it is still financially constrained, a firm may start to export with the increase in age: xt+1|g t+1 =1 ≥ xt|g t =1; an exporting firm exports more with the increase in age: Lt+1|g t+1 = 1 ≥ Lt|gt = 1.
Proof: please see the appendix.
In the model, I measure financial development by κ, the cost of deviation. With high cost of deviation, firms prefer to stay producing. In contrast, low cost of deviation induces firms to deviate. Therefore, the κ can proxy the financial development in a country. A country i is more financially developed compared with another country j if κi > κj .
Proposition 2 (1) Given the productivity A and financial statusḡ, a firm tends to export in the financially developed country:
Conditional on productivity A, for a firm of given age t, it exports more in financially developed countries:
Perfect enforceability
In contrast, firms are not financially constrained in the economy with perfect contract enforceability:
Proposition 1' The exporting status of a firm does not depend on the firm's age and financial status.
(2) the exporting volume of a firm does not depend on the firm's age and financial status.
Proposition 2' the productivity cut-off for exporting is identical across countries; (2) conditional on productivity A and firm age t, the export volume Lt is identical across countries.
Numerical example
I calibrate the economy in a numerical example. The period in the economy is one year, and the intertemporal discount rate β is set to β = .96, matching the yearly interest rate 4%. The elasticity of substitution is chosen as σ = 1.5, which is a common value used in the literature. The iceberg cost and type-(ii) firms. Then I pick up one productivity value such that it represents a type-(ii) firm.
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Figure 14 graphically proves proposition 1. A type-(ii) firm starts to export in period 4 such that the export status jumps from 0 to 1 in that period. However, the firm reaches its optimal export level in period 14, as shown in the right graph. In other words, this firm is not financially constrained from period 14: gt = 1, t = 1, 2, · · · 13; gt = 0, t = 14, 15, · · · , ∞. It is clear that if the type-(ii) firm is not financially constrained, it exports (t = 14, 15, · · · , ∞); it may export or not when financially constrained (t = 1, 2, · · · 13);with the increase in age, the firm starts to export even it is financially constrained (from period 4). As for the exporting volume, the firm reaches its optimal level when gt = 0; the export volume is growing when the firm is financially constrained. Figure 16 shows that type-(ii) firms with the same productivity start to export earlier in financially developed countries, and export more before reaching the optimal level. The reason is in figure 17: in a financially developed countries, the default return is relatively low such that the lender lends higher initial capital to the firm, and the firm grows faster.
6 Empirical results
Summary statistics
I test the propositions using the data set from Enterprise Surveys constructed by the World Bank. Table   3 reports the summary statistics of key variables among non-exporters and exporters. Non-exporters are defined as firms that never exported in all survey years. Exporters are defined as firms that at least exported once in the time span of survey. In order to compare firms across countries and control the inflation effect, the nominal variables sale and wage are deflated and PPP adjusted 12 . Exporting firms are larger than those that never do, in terms of the number of employees and real sales. Exporting firms are on average 6 years older than non-exporters. The wage level is also higher among exporters. I report two more variables that may affect the status of exporting: foreign ownership and quality certification. Foreign ownership is the percentage of firms owned by private foreign individuals, companies, or organizations, ranging from 0 to 100. Quality certification is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm has an internationally-recognized quality certification; 0 if not. The percentage of foreign ownership for exporters is 15.39%, approximately as twice as that of higher non-exporters. 39% of exporters obtain the internationally-recognized quality certification, while only 16% of non-exporters have it. 22% of nonexporters are financially constrained, while only 14% of exporters are financially constrained. I find the differences between two groups are statistically significant for all variables.
Effects of age and financial constraints
I empirically test the proposition 1 and 1'. I set the proportion 1' has the null hypothesis: the exporting status of a firm, and the exporting volume are irrelevant with the firm's age and financial status. The alternative hypothesis is the proposition 1: either or not financially constrained affect firms' exporting decision.
I define the age of a firm i in year t as ait. In the model, all firms are born in period 0 such that the period t is exactly the age for all firms. In the data set, however, firms do not enter into the market in the same period. I define all other control variables as Zit, which includes firm size, real sale per worker, ownership, quality certificate certificate, and time and sector dummies. For readers' convenience, I repeat the definitions of xit and git here: the export status dummy xit equals one if the firm i exports in period t; otherwise, it equals zero. The indicator of financial constraint git equals one if the firm i is financially constrained in period t; otherwise, it equals zero.
I estimate the Probit model
The null hypothesis would be rejected if β1 < 0, β2 > 0, β3 > 0 and statistically significant. In words, being financially constraint reduces the probability of exporting. But the negative effect of financial constraints is alleviated with the increase in the firm's age.
I use four models to estimate equation ( observations. Therefore, the standard error for each coefficient is larger. In the last regression, all estimatesβ1 = −.70,β2 = .01,β3 = .01 are close to these estimates from random-effects panel Probit model. But only the coefficient for the financial constraint is statistically significant.
Estimation results are reported in table 4. As expected, all four columns show that the probability of exporting is negatively associated with the status of being financially constrained, i.e., β1 < 0; firms tend to export with the increase in the age as β2 > 0; the negative effect of being financially constrained is diminishing with the increase in age as the coefficient of the interaction term is negative: β3 > 0.
I also compute the marginal effects of one unit increase in independent variables on the probability of exporting. Because Probit and Logit models are nonlinear, the marginal effects are different at different independent variable levels. I compute all marginal effects at the mean level. Table 8 summarizes marginal effects in pooled Probit, random-effects panel Probit, and fixed-effects panel Logit models.
Taking the pooled Probit model as an example, for an average firm, being financially constraint reduces the probability of exporting by 15%; given being financially constrained, the probability of exporting increases by 0.3% if the firm gets one year older.
I estimate the Heckman model for exporting volume:
where Zit includes all control variables for the probability of exporting: firm size, real sale per worker, ownership, and quality certificate certificate, time and sector dummies, λ(Z ′ it ζ) is inverse mills ratio. Table 6 shows the estimation result for equation (21) . Firms tend to export more if they are not financially constrained, i.e. α1 < 0; the export volume grows with firms' age as indicated by the positive sign of α2; but there is no statistically significant evidence for the interaction between age and financial constraint. Again I use proposition 2' from the model with perfect enforceability as the null hypothesis: the probability of exporting and exporting volume are identical across countries, given the age and financial status. The alternative hypothesis is in proposition 2: controlling for age and financial status, firms tend to export and export more in a financially developed country. I useκc to represent the empirical measure of financial development in country c. I estimate the Probit model for the probability of exporting:
The null hypothesis will be rejected if β1 < 0, β2 > 0, and β3 > 0. Table 7 summarizes the estimation results of equation (22) . Under all five specification of financial development, the null hypothesis is rejected as β3 > 0 is statistically significant. Table 8 computes the marginal effects of financial development on the probability of exporting. Taking the proxy of financial development: legal rights index as an example, for an average firm, given being financially constrained, one unit increase in the legal rights index increases the probability of exporting by 0.7%.
I estimate the Heckman model for the exporting volume
The null hypothesis will be rejected if α1 < 0, α2 > 0, and α3 > 0. Table 9 summarizes the estimation results of equation (23) . There is mixed evidence. The null hypothesis is rejected in the fourth regression, which proxies financial development using public credit registry coverage; but α3 is not statistically significant in the first, third, and fifth regressions and has the wrong sign in the second regression.
Technology and innovation
In section 2, I already use the real sale per worker three years before as a proxy of productivity. In this sub-section, I consider another proxy for productivity, the value of equipment. I use the cost for a firm to re-purchase all of its machinery as the proxy for the firm's technology accumulation, which is denoted by Wit. In order to control the size effect, the value of equipment is divided by the number of employees.
I use the annual equipment expenditure per employee as a proxy for the innovation, which is denoted by wit. Figure 18 shows that old firms have no advantage in technology accumulation and they do not input more on innovation, compared with young firms. Table 10 uses OLS regressions (24) to check the relationship between productivity and firm age. I use all proxies of productivity: equipment value Wit, equipment expenditure wit, and labor productivity mit (logged real sale per worker). In table 10, there is no statistically positive relationship between firm age and productivity.
where yit = wit, Wit, mit; Zit includes country, year, and sector dummies.
Conclusion
This paper reconciles the firm growth theory with the new trade theory, in order to explain new stylized facts in firms' exporting behavior. In the model, entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Firms only have limited commitment on the contract such that they may default and run away with capital. The lenders need to restrain firms' capital level to prevent firms from defaulting. But firms may eventually reach optimal capital level after accumulating the return net of payments to lenders in certain periods. Firms are financially constrained if their capital is below the optimal level obtained from the financial environment of perfect enforceability. The model implies that firms tend to export if they are not financially constrained; they can begin to export, or export more if started exporting before with the increase in age. The model also suggests that the financial constraints have attenuated effects in financially developed countries. Estimation using the data set from Enterprise Surveys verifies the effect of financial constraints on firms' exporting behavior.
A From the original problem to the saddle point problem I follow the method in Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004, [16] ) to re-write the optimal contract problem from a Lagrangian problem to a saddle-point problem. Below is the detailed proof. Briefly speaking, step 1 writes out the Lagrangian problem; step 2 computes one item in the Lagrangian problem; step 3 uses the results from step 1 and step 2 to write out the saddle point problem. After the proof, I make a summary on the transformation of the problem and the guideline of characterizing the solution of the new problem.
Step 1 I re-write the constraint (5) as
Given the relationship between payment to the lender and the dividend of the firm (2), the constraint can be written as
I rewrite the first and second item on the left hand side into a unified form:
The extra term −β −1 (k1 + x1c x ) in R1 does not affect the computation later. To save space, I only write Rt as a function of kt and kt+1 when taking partial derivatives.
Therefore, the break-even condition can be written as
Comparing two forms of the break-even condition (5) and (25) , it is easy to obtain
Assume the Lagrangian multiplier for (4) is γt, t = 1, 2, · · · and that for (25) is λ0. We can write the Lagrangian problem from the original one as
Ignoring the constant −λ0I0 yields
All items except the last one are easy to deal with.
Step 2 describes how to simplify the last item.
Step 2 I need to prove the identity that
The identity above is a mathematic formula. For readers' convenience I write down the proof:
Step 3 Plugging in the result in step 2 into that in step 1, I get
Note that γt =μt −μt−1 ifμt =μt−1 + γt, the Lagrangian problem can be written as
Dividing the Lagrangian by λ0 and define the new state as µt =
Finally, to maximize the original Lagrangian problem, we have to minimize µt. The reason is that minimizing µt is equivalent with minimizing γt by (9) . When γ reaches its minimum zero, the no-deviation condition does not bind such that the objective function could reach its maximum. Therefore, we get the saddle point problem.
Summary
Step 3 above proved that the original Lagrangian problem can be transformed into a saddle point problem. Marcet and Marimon (1998, [27] ) guarantees that solving the saddle point problem is equivalent with solving the original maximization problem.
B Solving the recursive problem
Envelope condition for µ−1:
Equation (10) says that as long as µ > µ−1, or µ is growing, it is optimal to set d = 0 to minimize the item (1 − µ)d in the objective function. Then the first order condition (10) can be simplified as
With the envelope condition (27) , it implies that
Envelope condition for k:
Similarly,
where k ′′ = kt+2.
Substituting (28) into (12) yields
Solve the problem
In this part, To characterize the solutions, I need to solve the optimal capital level for the domestic and exporting market first. In the equilibrium, by the symmetry,
, which is the resource of payment and dividend from the domestic market :
where Φ is a constant. 13 The optimal capital k x * (A) maximizes −k
which is the resource of payment and dividend from the foreign market. The optimal level of k x * (A) is
Given Rt, I further decompose Rt into two parts Rt = R h t + xtR
R h t corresponds to the domestic market and R x t corresponds to the export market.The maximal domestic return at the optimal capital
I follow the solution procedure to describe how to solve the optimal contract problem for type-(ii) firms:
a firm starts to serve the domestic market optimally but export to the foreign market under the optimal level, xt = 1, t = 1, 2, · · · . Solutions for all other firms can be derived in a similar way. In particular, type-(i) firms are not restricted by constraints; type-(iii) firms only serve the domestic market at the optimal level; type-(iv) firms follow the procedure below except k First, assume the firm reaches its optimal level k * = k * h + k * x from age T + 1, where k * h , k * x have been solved out. Second, I solve the model backward. At age T , D(k
because the no-deviation constraint is binding. The full sequence of the capital level is characterizes as
Note that given the equation (31), a value of T corresponds to a value of k1 because T defines how long the firm will be constrained and (31) defines the capital level in each constrained period.
Third, the zero-profit condition for the financial intermediary determines the optimal T , or the initial capital k1:
where the left hand side can be decomposed into two parts: the discounted sum ∞ t=1 β t Rt and dividends
The discounted sum of profits include the domestic return
) and the return from the export market
; the dividends consist of zero payment before firms reach age T and constant payments after age T :
the constant dividends from age T + 1 can be derived from the zero-profit condition of the financial intermediary:
Therefore, the objective function for the firm can be re-arranged as
This problem can only be solved numerically. Intuitively there is trade-off about T : as T → 0, the contract reaches the optimal export volume level earlier, but firms may deviate; as T → ∞, the contract prevents firms from deviating, but decreases the discounted value of dividends such that firms may switch to another lender. Therefore, there should be a unique T such that it maximizes the discounted sum of dividends, as well as satisfying the zero-profit condition for the lender 15 .
C The cutoff points
The cutoff between (i) and (ii): It defines the cutoff between type-(i) and type-(ii) firms: if firms start to export at the optimal level. The difference between two types of firms is whether the no-deviation condition always holds strictly.
In the optimal contract, type-(i) firms produce at the optimal level from the initial period. In all following periods, their profits in the domestic and foreign markets are constant at the optimal level such that the dividend for the firm d is constant. 16 The financial intermediary breaks even:
Moreover, (4) never binds.
Substituting (34) into (4) and using the symmetry condition
where S12 is a constant.
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The cutoff between (ii) and (iii): it defines the cutoff between type-(ii) and type-(iii) firms:
whether firms export.
Define the productivity set of type-(ii) firmsÃ23 as
where k x t , t = 1, 2, · · · satisfy no-deviation constraint (4) and zero-profit constraint (25)}.
In words,Ã23 should be smaller than the cutoffĀ12; otherwise, the firm would export optimally from the initial period. If and only if R x (k x t (A), k x t+1 (A)) ≥ 0, the firm exports. Because of the incomplete market, it needs to satisfy the no-deviation condition (4) and the zero-profit condition (25) . In summary,
A23 defines all firms that start to export under the optimal level but will reach the optimum eventually. 16 The constant dividend is one of many optimal dividend plans. But all dividend plans have the same discounted sum.
The cutoff is the greatest lower bound ofÃ23:Ā23 = inf(Ã23).
The cutoff between (iii) and (iv): it defines the cutoff between type-(iii) and type-(iv) firms:
whether firms start the domestic production at the optimal level. The difference between two types of firms is whether the no-deviation condition always holds strictly. It is similar to the cutoff between (i) and (ii).
In the optimal contract, type-(iii) firms produce at the optimal level from the initial period. In all following periods, their profits in the domestic market are constant at the optimal level such that the dividend for the firm d * is constant. The financial intermediary breaks even:
where S34 is a constant.
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The cutoff between (iv) and (v): it defines the cutoff between type-(iv) and type-(v) firms:
whether firms produce or can not get contracts. (4) and (25)}.
DefineÃ45 as
In words,Ã45 should be smaller than the cutoffĀ34; otherwise, the firm would serve the domestic market optimally from the initial period. If and only if
, the firm produces. Because of the incomplete market, it needs to satisfy the no-deviation condition (4) and the zero-profit condition (25) . In summary,Ã45 defines all firms that start to serve the domestic market under the optimal level but will reach the optimum eventually. The cutoff is the greatest lower bound ofÃ45:Ā45 = inf(Ã45).
D The model with perfect enforceability
The optimization problem
can be rewritten as
In the equilibrium, by the symmetry,
, which is the resource of payment and dividend from the foreign market. The optimal level of k 
I compute the expected export probability of all firms with no financial constraint by summing up the conditional expectation on every type of firms:
The expected export probability of all firms with financial constraints is lower than that among firms with no financial constraints:
I compute the expected export volume using a similar method:
.
Only type-(ii) and type-(iv) may be financially constrained. Type-(iv) firms never export: xt+1|g t+1 =1 = xt|g t =1 = 0, Lt+1|g t+1 =1 = Lt|g t =1 = 0. For type-(ii) firms, they may start to export and export volume grows then they are financially constrained. The subsection "numerical example" shows such a case:
Proof of proposition 2 The higher the deviation cost κ is, the more financially developed the country is. I add primes ( ′ ) to all variables with a higher deviation cost κ ′ > κ.
With the higher deviation cost κ ′ , the return from deviation is relatively low such that such that the no deviation condition becomes easier to hold
Assume the new productivity set of type-(ii) firms asÃ
where k Note: the dependent variable is firms' export decision x it , which equals one if firm i exports in period t, otherwise zero. "fconstraint" is the dummy variable g it , which equals one if firms are financially constrained; zero otherwise. "agef" is the product of a it and g it . Control variables include dummy "medium", dummy "large", "lprod", dummy "ownership", and dummy "certificate". Dummy variables "medium" and "large" measure firm size: firms are medium if they have 20 to 99 employees, large if they have 100 or more employees, defined by Enterprise Surveys. Small firms (6 to 19 employees) are used as the benchmark. "lprod" is the logged PPP-adjusted real sale per worker, used as a proxy for firms' productivity. Detailed description about "ownership" and "certificate" are in table 3. Year dummies are included in all models. Sector dummies are included in model (1) (2) (4) but not (3). Note: the dependent variable is log(L it ), the logged export volume for each firm, where export volume is in constant price (2005 as base year) and PPP-adjusted. Detailed descriptions about "fconstraint", "age", and "agef" are in table 4. The first stage regression of exporting probability controls firm size, foreign ownership, quality certification, year and sector dummies. Note: Private credit / GDP is from Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009). It is the ratio between private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institution and GDP. The other four measures of financial development is from the Doing Business data base, World Bank Group. The strength of legal rights index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. It ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating between collateral and bankruptcy. The depth of credit information index measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility and quality of credit information available through either public or private credit registries. It ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information. The public credit registry coverage reports the number of individuals and firms listed in a public credit registry with information on repayment history, unpaid debts or credit outstanding from the past five years. It is expresses as a percentage of the adult population. The private credit bureau coverage reports the number of individuals and firms listed by a private credit with information on repayment history, unpaid debts or credit outstanding from the past five years. It is expresses as a percentage of the adult population. All regressions control firm size, foreign ownership, quality certification, country, year and sector dummies. Figure 2: Probability of exporting: by groups of age and productivity
Note: all observations are split into four productivity groups: TFP1 (0 − 25%), TFP2 (25% − 50%), TFP3 (50% − 75%), and TFP4 (75% − 100%), where the proxy of productivity is logged and PPP-adjusted sale per worker three years before. In each productivity group, observations are further split into three age groups: age1 (0 − 25%), age2(26% − 75%), and age3 (75% − 100%). Note: details about the age group is in the note of figure 4. Firms are financially constrained if they applied loans but were rejected, or if they did not apply because the loan cost was too high. Note: details about the productivity group is in the note of figure 2. Note: details about the productivity group is in the note of figure 2. Note: details about the productivity group is in the note of figure 2. There is no observation in age group 1 (age ≥ 8), productivity group 3. Therefore the upper right is blank. Note: details about the productivity group is in the note of figure 2. 
